THE KOMSOMOL:
AFTER 70 YEARS NOTHING HAS CHANGED
by Curtis Minich
March 22, 1988
Political Science 498
Prof. T. Friedgut
University of Pennsylvania
The Komsomol of the Soviet Union is a curious
feature of that nation's political system. While having a unique relationship with
the Communist Party, it also exists as a typical product of the regime's totalitarian
rule. The Party has prescribed a certain amount of responsibility to the Komsomol,
but it is questionable as to how much political influence is vested there. For a
critical analysis of its usefulness, a measure of its political influence is needed
and, also, a specific description of what particular role it does play.
Unique to the "All-Union Leninist Communist
League," as it is formally known, is the extent to which the Party relies on
it to fulfill its assigned tasks. It is evident that the Young Communist League (YCL)
is failing to perform as effectively as is necessary. The YCL will be marking its
seventieth anniversary this year. Self-examination is presently being made and the
problems which account for its failure will be realized, if they have not been already.
These problems are essentially those which derive from the Party's insistent desire
to circumscribe and even repress political interest and opinions. In this respect,
the YCL is not an unusual Soviet institutional product. What is necessary to realize,
though, is that due to the importance of its ordained function, it is a critical
element of the Party's strategy for reaching an advanced stage of communism in the
USSR. The YCL's role in sculpting the youngest generation's political attitudes of
ideology, as well as its natural tendency to influence the youth's attitudes toward
the Party (and its methods of political repression), give it peculiar significance.
It is especially interesting now to see if glasnost will give enough momentum to
produce a change in the youth's image or the YCL may become more favorable thus averting
future problems and detours on the road to communism. What is certain is that after
seventy years of restrictive control, the Party cannot risk tightening its grasp,
for the youth are far more likely than ever before of making their disaffections
with the system known in ways that the Party most assuredly would hope to avert.
The Komsomol's place in Soviet politics is not
clearly discernible to the foreign observer. It surely has no equivalent in the
liberal-democratic governments of the West. But, more surprising, is that even the
casual Soviet political observer would probably be at a loss if asked to define the
specific role and nature of the YCL. A naive citizen would probably credit the League
with performing a significant function in formulating political policy, particularly
where youth are affected among other tasks.
It is most important to realize the relationship
between the Party and the YCL before making any analysis of the League's role. Because
the Party is the totalitarian source of political power anything that the YCL or
any Soviet institution does is with the consent and probably the instructions of
the Party. Is the observer correct in his depiction? Is there even a mild form
of political pluralism and discussion between the two? Or, to what extent can the
Komsomol, be viewed as separate, or even an "independently acting social organization,"
as it is labeled in the
CPSU rules?
To say that the Bolsheviks created the YCL may
not be wholly true. There were a number of youth associations that grew out of the
unrest of 1917, though the majority were probably oriented toward social recreational
objectives. Nevertheless, being more pragmatic than having an actual concern for
the youth's political ideas, the Party opportunistically advertised "itself
as a champion of youth's 'active participation in the economic and political struggle
of the working class.'"1 In 1918, the first Komsomol Congress was held. During
the first year of the Revolution before this Congress, the Bolsheviks were wary of
formally organizing a youth communist group. Instead, they sought to control the
separate independent groups from within. But the first Congress was an initiative
of the Bolshevik Party even though many of the delegates were not Party members.
By the second Congress in 1919, the Party was well on its way toward assuming total
control of the League. "The congress expressed its complete adherence to the
program and tactics of the Party and recognized its own central committee as immediately
subordinate to the Party Central Committee."2 Even in the first year when certain
amount of political debate was necessary, the YCL "reelected in magnified form
the opposition and disillusionment discernible in the party itself."3 The Party's
hostility toward deviances from official Party-line has restricted even the expression
of political opinion ever since.
The purpose of its creation was not to increase
political inputs. This demonstrates that the League is not capable of political influence.
Having control of the organization by its second congress, the Party has never, in
the intervening years, given it away. What ability that the youth may have ever had
to express themselves has been rendered inefficacious. "To a large extent, it
is the fundamental task of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to prevent these
and other social groupings from acquiring the self-consciousness and political techniques
thatwould enable them to articulate group demands."4
For the purposes of this study, what is actually
meant by the vague idea of "political influence"? It could mean the actual
formulation and implementation of specific policies and procedures. Conversely, political
influence may be construed as something which is a byproduct of being a Party member,
or politically involved as a member of a soviet committee, for example. Since we
are evaluating the role of the Komsomol and how it is responsible for the current
condition of the YCL, we can deduce that by political influence we mean some ability
to use and express initiative in helping formulate political policy independently,
which would give a member some sort of satisfaction. It Is clear that because of
the suffocating guidance of the Party, the YCL does not have this ability. It is
an ignorance of just how closely the Party guides the YCL that leads a naive observer
to believe that the League has some influence. The degree of Party guidance will
be discussed later as a reason for the disaffection and ineffectiveness of the YCL.
Aryeh L. Unger perfomed a study on the political
participation of the YCL in 1981. While he admits that "political participation
is both a vague and a vague concept,"5 one can be sure that whatever it means,
whether by a communist or a liberal-democratic perception, is that where there is
political influence there must first be political participation. It is necessary
here to at least give political participation a rigid meaning that includes more
than just involvement of citizens in public affairs, including the expression of
ceremonial supports and assistance in the administration of communities or the implementation
of regime policies."6 It was a more rigid definition that Unger used to preclude
that, "we study political participation, after all, not only for its presumed
impact on decision-making (at whatever level) but also for its presumed impact on
the participants themselves."7 Unger concluded that the interviewees of his
study did not believe their participation to be effective,8 whatever the level might
have been. Some even went as far as calling the Komsomol " a joke" and
"impotent".9
So, the League is not influential for the simple,
if not evident, reason that it was never meant to be. Or was it? If it was not intended
that the YCL be a helpful actor in policymaking then what was it to be? Historically
the basic tasks assigned to the Komsomol have not changed although emphasis is put
on different ones at different times.
If the YCL was just used as a supporter during
the early years of revolution, then its job was only to "generate the momentum
of innovation, "10 and nothing more. The League was simply a cheerleader during
the Civil War period.ll This inactivity led some to call for "renewed demands
for the organizational democracy and local autonomy,"l2 and they made themselves
heard at the Third Congress. Lenin himself hypocritically downplayed the need for
the youth's influence in politics, after seeming to call for it in the early years
when he disparately needed the youth's support against the older adherents of more
mild forms of revolution. "Lenin - who before the revolution had scoffed at
efforts to dissuade youth from political involvement as 'hypocritical and obscurantist'
- now insisted in effect that politics was not their concern . . ."13 He stated
at this Congress that the tasks of youth in general, not only the YCL, could be summed
up as a single word: learn.14 He thus ignored not only the idea that the YCL should
be involved in actual policy-making but, also, that Komsomolites must be different
from ordinary youth, remember that at this time the membership for the YCL was very
selective.
The New Economic Policy caused much dissension
within the League, if not in all areas of political discussion. This resulted in
persecution of the opposition elements who rallied behind Trotsky's idea that the
youth had a right to form its own opinions 'to transform them into flesh and blood.'
Thousands of Trotskyists were expelled.15
As for Stalin, he never gave the YCL a chance
to develop as an influential policy source either. As early as 1925, he warned the
editors of the main Komsomol newspaper that it "was 'not an organ for discussion,
but an organ which is, first and foremost positive, which gives readers slogans and
viewpoints accepted by the party.'"l6 Later, in 1936, the Party determined that
it was necessary to revise the Program of the League which had been intact since
1921,17 and "under the banner of Stalin's new watchword 'cadres decide everything,'
the main task of the Komsomol was no declared to be communist indoctrination of the
youth. The Komsomols were not to participate in economic questions as actively as
they had done before; their major attention was to be turned to the educational task."18
Even after World War II, "students were encouraged to apply themselves to their
studies and avoid spending too much time on extra-curricular political activities
of the Komsomol."l9
It must be noted also that ever since the First
Congress the YCL was denied representation on the executive committees of soviets.20
Even as individuals in the soviets, Komsomolites "should participate as Soviet
citizens and individual Komsomol members rather than with any aim of directing the
soviets on behalf of the Komsomol as an organization."21
Despite the triviality of League involvement
in politics, there has always been a plethora of party rhetoric stating otherwise.
This must be noted for two reasons. First, one must not be misled by this propaganda.
Second, by covering up its own shortcomings in extending democratic right to the
citizens, the Party is actually making the situation worse by being hypocritical.
As we will see later, this only exacerbates discontentment among the younger generation.
Examples of the deceit are prolific. In a magazine published for distribution in
the US in 1962, the Soviet writer
says, "The Komsomol has great influence and prestige, and it recommendations
and proposals are always listened to and most often adopted."22 Brezhnev said
in his speech to the YCL's Fifteenth Congress that, "the Party's new decisions
open up broad horizon for development of the initiative of the YCL organizations
. . ."2 Khrushchev said at the Fourteenth Congress (in 1962) that the YCL actively
participates in building a new society.24 Maybe one explanation for the leaders'
constant recitation of the Komsomols' participation in politics is because Lenin
had prescribed it in those first few years. Lenin demonstrated that without active
participation in public affairs that book knowledge of communism is worthless. One
can only become a good communist if he applies the book knowledge.25 Thus the Party
is seeming to justify that Komsomolites are becoming the perfect communists in their
'active participation'. Taking all of this into consideration, one can classify the
YCL as an element of the political system of the USSR. David Lane forms the description
that technically the Komsomol is a part of the political leadership because by nature
it is not in a "middle range of power,” nor is it a facet of mass participation
(although arguably it has become that). Also, this is because of its unique relationship
with the Party as its main helper and instrument in building communism. But, the
Komsomol is as divorced from political power as the other institutions of the political
system such as trade unions and the government organizations.26
The Komsomol is not an influential source in
Soviet politics,because the Party does not want it to be. There are several specific
constraints that are responsible for this though. One of these is the nature of the
Soviet system and the party's incessant desire to restrain the YCL. Another is the
behavior of the YCL leaders, as agents of the party. Third, the tendencies of contemporary
youth are undermining the effectiveness of the League. These factors are sometimes
interrelated.
Vladimir Shlapentokh accuses the system for causing
the youth to became disheartened. He even goes so far as to say that "young
people tend to suffer most from the arbitrariness and corruption of Soviet officials,"
because young people are most helpless in confronting officials and that they inherently
react more strongly then older people to the inequities of the bureaucracy.27 He
also blames the stagnation of the bureaucracy for the monopolization of important
positlon by the old and the very old.28
Sergei Zamascikov, who has held office in the
Komsomol, is very critical of the organization. In 1987, he observed that the Komsomol
"is an organization of conservatives, conformists, bureaucrats . . . for many
years the Komsomol has been vigilantly opposed to anything that would be attractive
to young people . . ."29 He noticed that by the early 1980's, offices were
occupied by young careerists who were busy collecting dues and writing reports of
their achievements to impress Party leaders.30 Along with the fact that the overwhelming
majority of leadership positions are held by older party members (who, by holding
office, can continue their Komsomol membership), this shows that it is not surprising
that the youth feel neglected and unimportant.
Also, there is confusion as to what type of organization
it is. While the League is used by the Party as a training camp for future leaders,
it can also be viewed as a mass organization. Zamascikov notes, "Gradually the
Komsomol grew from a volunteer organization of young zealots to an unofficial ministry
for youth affairs."31 Just because the current membership is around 38 million,
it is by rights a mass organization. The organization has overextended itself by
accepting less enthusiastic members. S.I. Ploss notes that, by 1940, the "Komsomol
was shorn of any identity as a body of 'chosen' youth and began to assume the form
which has since characterized it- that of a mass organization. . ."32; "mass
membership is diluted membership."33 Many of the rank-and-flle members join
because it is the thing to do, especially while in high school, and some of these
need to be "brainwashed" as Kristina Blass recalls in a letter to Pravda
about why she quit the Komsomol.34
Another problem which keeps it from serving its
purpose is that it causes disinterest among the rank-and-file members. "To judge
from the tone and content of the Komsomol press, the reaction of members is all too
frequently one of utter boredom and apathy ... since rank-and-file members have practically
no voice in Komsomol affairs,. . ., it is no wonder that they lack an active interest."35
However, it may not be the total fault of the Komsomol that these members are being
bored. There is evidence that the younger generations are just naturally less interested
in
politics. "To judge from these surveys,the reaction of most students to politically
oriented activities is one of passive indifference ."36 Again we see that it
may be the system which causes this attitude, for "it may reflect a natural
reaction to politically oppressive conditions in the USSR ..."37 or just the
inconveniences and discomforts of Soviet life which are attributed to the policies
of the regime.38
The lack of meaningful participation and the
abundance of contradicting Party rhetoric may combine to increase the rank-and-file
members' indifference. Unger reasons that "the combination of compulsion and
formalism which characterizes participation in the Komsomol . . .clearly provides
no scope at all for the development of a sense of efficacy. Indeed, one might well
hypothesize that it has the opposite effect, that the induction of the individual
into the 'spectacle' of Komsomol . . . activities impresses upon him the utter futility
of his participation. . ."39 The members are further disheartened if they realize
the extent to which the Party's rhetoric, about how useful the Komsomol is, falls
short of the true description. Also, the clash between the Party's call for initiative
(only meant in rhetoric) and discipline (which leads to the inability to effectively
participate) causes much disarray in the YCL.40
Kassof attributes much of the ineffectiveness of the YCL to the historic lack of
trust that the leaders of the Soviet Union have for the people. He says that,"...the
Komsomol is simply one more of the many institutions through which the Soviet leaders
seek to exert totalitarian controls over the populace...the Komsomol is no more likely
to be greeted with enthusiasm than are its adult counterparts. So long as the regime
maintains a basic mistrust of its citizenry, the Komsomol will continue to function
in this negative capacity."41
Because the Komsomol is to help the Party in
labor recruitment it often gets some negative publicity due to this unpopular task.42
Also, the YCL and the Party always encourages, rather forcefully, not only the fulflllment
of labor tasks summer camps in the North and the West, but the post-graduate job
assignments in those areas as well. This receives strong protest from young people
who have learned to enjoy the advantages of urban life.
The YCL leaders do not help matters, either.
First, the YCL leaders serve as agents of the Party. "Western scholars have
generally argued that the leadership stratum of the Youth League dutifully manipulates
the rank-and-file to conform to the demands and expectations of the DPS."43
This results in increasing the number of grievances among the Komsomolites and even
membership loss.44 Soviet writers have blamed some of the Komsomol's failures on
the poor training of youth leaders which in turn causes them to misdirect the energies
of the youth in a positive and constructive manner."45 Often the Party's remedy
for this leadership problem is to increase the amount of guidance that it has over
the YCL, making things worse yet with respect to the fact that discipline restrains
the Komsomol.
Are the young generations of today different
in nature and their attitudes than in the preceding ones? If so, this could explain
some changes in the nature of the YCL itself and its inability to control youth today,
like it used to. Interestingly, Boris Ponomaryov, a former CPSU Central Committee
member, made the observation in 1973 that,"'The middle-aged and the aged often
do not know how to approach the youth, 'Lenin wrote, 'for the youth must of necessity
advance to socialism in a different way, by other paths, in other forms, in other
circumstances than their fathers.' That is why set, rigid formulas are intolerable
in working with the youth."46 But, as we have noted, the YCL has been operating
under the same strict obedience to the Party throughout its history. Ploss wrote
in 1958 that he believed the YCL would remain In the future what it had been for
most of its history - "an organization not of youth but of, by, and for the
Communist Party."47 All Soviet sociological studies of the last two decades
showed that there is an inverse correlation between age and critical attitudes toward
the official ideology,48 but "political elite has preferred to ignore the changing
attitudes of young people toward Soviet ideology, despite their serious implications."49
Also, the regime has balked in response to the fanat movement, a violent protest
of self-expression by high school students in Moscow. "The passivity of the
authorities toward the fanat movement is without precedent."50 It may be that
the Soviet leaders cannot deal with this problem because they are aware that "the
Soviet system could be implicated in a development beyond its control."51 This
clearly demonstrates a lack of flexibility, despite Ponomaryev's demand for it.
"The fact that the Komsomol completely ignores the fanat movement may be perhaps
an indicator of the declining effectiveness of the organization, . . . which, does
not appear to exert much real influence on Soviet young people."52
Another point, on which party guidance has lost
control over the youth and thus YCL effectiveness, is the Party's tendency to neglect
the important problems which affect contemporary youth. Western trade, the higher
standard of living, more free time, as well as political indifference and immorality
have resulted in new problems in the youths' generation that the Party never had
to deal with before. Again its failure to solve them has resulted in loss of Komsomol
control over various widespread enthusiasts and informal organizations. Readers of
Pravda have criticized "the Komsomol for... avoiding the acute and pressing
problems of young people ..."53
There has been more than just evidence of new
Interests and tendencies among the youth. A youth culture developed in the mid-1950's
and since the mid-1970's. It has become mass in character in the Soviet Union.54
This has caused several damaging problems for the YCL. Crime has risen, ideological
fervor has decreased, and the number of informal youth organizations has increased.
Boredom has caused the youth to turn to liquor.55 Leaders are concerned that youth
are not patriotic enough.56 Of all things to happen, a "nazi" demonstration
broke out in Moscow in 1982.57 Also, Russian orthodoxy is becoming more popular
among the youth.58 The major difference today is that youths are more pragmatic,
less ideological.59 Furthermore, "among a minority, dissatisfaction is reflected
in nascent political unrest or in juvenile delinquency and hooliganism."60 Lastly,
"at all levels or the social hierarchy, Soviet youth have increasingly demonstrated
their unwillingness to subordinate personal gratification to the collective welfare."61
With these changes making life a little bit more satisfiable, "how can young
people be encouraged to take the concrete steps necessary to further socialism, when
... it is comfortable 'to live close to socialism'?"62 Therefore, because "the
mentality of contemporary Soviet youth is radically different from that of earlier
generations,"63 the YCL is finding it much more difficult to keep them in line
and to direct this towards being perfect Communists.
With an insight into the character and the shortcomings
of the Komsomol, one must look to see where it is headed. The main question is just
how open is the disaffection with the Komsomol? Peter H. Juviler maintains that
the youth are bound by patriotism and national pride. They also have a basic acceptance
for the superiority of socialism over capitalism.64 He continues, that only if the
pressure "even reaches a point where it cannot be ignored,the party-regime will
feel secure enough to move in a direction of genuine tolerance...65 Nicholas Daniloff
agrees that youth disaffection is not nearly strong enough to cause Soviet society
to crumble.56
Even the Soviets themselves realize the importance
of protecting the YCL at this time. A reader of Pravda writes that the League should
be an experimental base for the Party and all of society.67 But, because the Party
is forced to keep control "the regime is compelled by the logic of its own rule
to perpetuate the Komsomol in its present role and form.68 Actually, there are only
two alternatives. One is a genuine youth organization, but this would be seen as
a threat to Party authority. The second is no organization at all which would
make disaffection much harder to check. Nether alternative is possible in a totalitarian
state.69
Something is presently happening for the first
time in the history of the YCL. Independent political groups have been created in
response to Gorbachev's glasnost policy. They are challenging the authority of the
YCL. What has put a strain on the newly formed relationship between the state and
the informal organizations is essentially an umbra of mutual distrust.70 None of
the organizations are sure about what should be done including the YCL and the Party.
An internal draft was written by the Komsomol's Central Committee late in 1987. It
rather harshly criticized the organization by saying, "The creative quest of
young people should be secured above all within the framework of existing Komsomol
organizatlons and committees. There is no need for the creation of alternative organizations."71
The document admitted "that many of the groups serve a valuable function"
but that "the impermissability of uncontrolled activities by youth associations,
especially of a sociopolitical nature" must be known.72 Viktor I. Mironenko,
the national head of the Komsomol, said just this year that he sees no contradiction
between the existence of the Komsomol and the widest spectrum of different kinds
of groups but that each member of every group must still obey the Komsomol code.73
How much autonomy will be given away by the YCL and to how many organizations remains
to be seen.
Finally, to see just how much hope there is for
an effective restructuring of the Komsomol it will be very beneficial to look at
Gorbachev's speech (his first) to the Twentieth Komsomol Congress an April 17, 1987.
His perceptions of the problems and the contemporary needs are quite consistent with
those outlined throughout this paper.
He states the need to restructure the Komsomol
first of all. He continues, "Comrades, the party's main task, if one is talking
about the problems of the cuuntry's youth movement today, is to open up the widest
prospects for young people, to make the doors wide open to them everywhere - in every
area of economic, scientific, and technical progress, social creativity, and spiritual
development. This means giving young men and women scope for independence, freeing
them from petty surveillance and supervision, and equating them by means of real
deeds and the exercise of real responsibility - by trust." He says that the
most important areas in work with youth are to develop personal initiative and to
create conditions for the mass participation of youth. Gorbachev counters the argument
about a lack of initiative and autonomy in the Komsomol claiming that Komsolites
were deprived of autonomy from the very beginning because their leaders watched every
step that they made. "Is this what party leadership of the Komsomol really mean?"
he asks. He continues, "But surely it is only by participating in the political
process and all matters pertaining to life and society that it is possible to be
genuine fighters for the cause of Lenin. . ." In the modern and complex world
there are certain forces in it that strive to push false values, mislead the young,
lead them away from active political struggle and participation in social processes,
and that propel the into a world of everyday cares so as to ensure that they are
politically emasculated.'14
Gorbachev has a good basic analysis of the main
problems with the Komsomol. What he does not do though is to go into detail of what
he specifically means by "restructuring the YCL." Is the infrastructure
repairable or should the Komsomol be dissolved as Zamascilov proposes? The Komsomol
is very old and it has grown stale. Allen Kassof wrote in 1965 that, "barring
fundamental changes on the Soviet scene, the youth organizations and the program
they embody will remain enduring features of the system."75 Is Gorbachev willing
to make a "fundamental change"? If he does not, will the young generation
realize his mistake when they in turn become the leaders of the Sovlet Union?
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